

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WAZIRISTAN: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS IN PAKISTAN ON TERRA

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ABSTRACT

This empirical study examines the military operation launched by the Government of Pakistan in Waziristan. It will discuss the wide range causes and effects of the military operation. This study discusses the phenomena of military operation in Waziristan and the Taliban targeting US-led forces. This survey reveals the Public opinion regarding drone attacks of NATO forces. This explanatory study reviews the mastermind behind the terra acts and financial support. This study also synthesis the categorical opinion of the tribal flees from their native villages.

INTRODUCTION

The study is exploratory in nature. This paper specifically explores the public perception of the migrated and innocent people from South Waziristan to other parts of the country (Pakistan). World think tank is of the opinion that Waziristan is a paradise for Taliban. Pakistan was stressed that the Taliban should be eliminated from this part of the world. The ongoing fighting began in 2004, when the Pakistan Army entered the region inhabited by the Waziri tribe in search of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters who were using the Waziristan area as a base for launching deadly attacks against the US-led Allied forces

in Afghanistan. Since the fighting began, the Pakistani forces have suffered heavy casualties at the hands of the Taliban militia due to roadside bombs and ambushes.

The military Operation *Rah e Nijat* (path to deliverance) is the latest attempt of Pakistan army to inflict final blows to the Tehrik- i- Taliban in Pakistan. Waziristan's new landmarks speak eloquently of the intensity of the conflict that still rages between Taleban and al-Qaeda militants and the Pakistani security forces. On 19th of June Pak army started the gathering of forces on the border of South Waziristan. After

three months of blockade and minor skirmishes with the Taliban eventually the army launched a full scale ground assault on the 19th of October 2009. The Pakistan army has a total of 28000 troops and 500 special commandos on their side while the Taliban have 10 to 15,000 troops and 1500 foreign fighters. The fighting is intense and arduous and each day brings reports of the Pakistan army inching forward another few steps deep into a very difficult and dangerous terrain (Global Voices Online, 2009)

Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” asserted forthrightly that al- Qaeda “has protected or regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership” (Muhammad, 2004).

The Pakistan army is conducting Advance-to-Contact operations on three axes:

- East: Jandola-Kotkai-Sararogha axis.
- South-West: Wana-Shakai axis
- North: Razmak-Makeen-Sararogha axis.

The three advancing columns should eventually link up around Sararogha,

and, having cleared and consolidated the three major approaches to the area, the final battle will then be fought for the capture of Sararogha, the Taliban strong-point. One could also assume that the operation will continue as the popular will is in favor of the military action (Masood, 2009). Taliban is not a new phenomenon. It is a rebound of Russian invasion. They have been used as bullfighters. The fighters are the Pakistan and America. Former President Pervez Musharraf has played the role of a sponsor while Bush was presented as a pious villain and playboy by the western media. Musharraf’s yes to war on terror is still a question mark (Rajat, 2007).

The conflict began in 2004 as a result Pakistan's search for Al Qaeda members in the mountainous Waziristan region as part of the War on Terror. Militant tribes who had ruled the area under a de facto autonomy interpreted the searches as a violation of their territorial claim and responded with force. The US war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan has created many problems for the investment community in the region, but the US could nothing gain; the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan have now filled many difficulties in the American

forces and their so-called operation against terrorism (Khan, 2003)".

Waziristan is America's new front line in the war against the Taliban. The last British officer to have served there, now 81, tells it cannot be tamed by force alone. Few places on earth are as remote and hostile as Waziristan, part of the Pakistani tribal belt that the Pentagon now sees as the new front line in the war on terror (Lamb, 2008).

Statistically speaking, the Pakistani security forces have lost more personnel – almost three times more, since the operation was launched in 2004 – than the US has since 2001, in its ongoing war on terror in Afghanistan" (Mir, 2004).

Most of the tribesmen allegedly giving refuge to al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects and now fighting with them against the Pakistani army belong to the Wazir tribe. The tribesmen are traditional fighters and learn the use of a gun at an early age in keeping with local traditions (Yusufzai, 2004).

Statement of the Problem

The problem of the study in hand is to explore the "Military Operations in Waziristan:

Public Perceptions in Pakistan on Terra".

Significance of the Study

People of Waziristan deserve to have war. They have totally rejected our constitution, because they reject the values which Pakistan was founded upon, and because they are trying to stuff a different legal system down the throats of unwilling citizens. The ongoing operation in FATA especially in South Waziristan has, understandably, caused heated debate in Pakistan as it raises issues of political morality and military strategy. This is not the first time that the armed forces have taken upon themselves the task of weeding out 'anti-state elements'. Pakistan's historical context suggests that the meddling of the armed forces in politics and policing of the country hasn't served the country well. But fortunately or unfortunately the operation against the militants is the dire need of the time.

Objectives of the Study

The main objectives of this opinion survey are as under:

- 1 To explore the origin of militants activities and to whom Taliban fights
- 2 To know who are the Taliban

- 3 To understand the Public perception regarding drone attacks of NATO forces
- 4 To see that who is mastermind behind Taliban

Research Questions

1. Does Taliban fighting for financial benefits?
2. Why Taliban targeting Pakistani entities?

Theoretical Underpinning of Opinion

The theoretical framework presented here guides and structures this study. It has set the foundation of the theory of the “Military Operations in Waziristan: Public Perceptions in Pakistan on Terra”. The framework of this study has its roots in three communication theories: public opinion, Attribution Theory, and Theory of Terrorism.

Public Opinion Theory

Public opinion is the aggregate of individual attitudes or beliefs held by the adult population. Yet conflict situations present their own challenges, and the traditional tools of public opinion research cannot simply be imported (Irwin C 2001).

Attribution Theory (Heider, 1958)

Attribution Theory is a humanistic theory. Attribution Theory attempts to explain causes of behavior. It attempts to explain the causes of people's behavior and attributing or explaining reasons as to why people behave the way they do.

Theory of Terrorism

More than one criminologist has pointed out that the disciplines of theology, religion, and philosophy have had important things to say about terrorism (Stitt 2003; Kraemer 2004). It is also a fact that about a quarter of all terrorist groups and about half of the most dangerous ones on earth are primarily motivated by religious concerns (Hoffman 1993). They believe that God not only approves of their action, but that God demands their action. Their cause is sacred, and consists of a combined sense of hope for the future and vengeance for the past. Of these two components, the backward-looking desire for vengeance may be the more important trigger for terrorism because the forward-looking component (called apocalyptic thinking or eschatology) produces wild-eyed fanatics who are

more a danger to themselves and their own people.

Main Concepts

1. Military Operation
2. Public perception on terra

Perception is the process by which organisms interpret and organize sensation to produce a meaningful experience of the world. Sensation usually refers to the immediate, relatively unprocessed result of stimulation of sensory receptors in the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, or skin. Perception, on the other hand, better describes one's ultimate experience of the world and typically involves further processing of sensory input. In practice,


sensation and perception are virtually impossible to separate, because they are part of one continuous process.

Assumptions

- Our common-sense understanding of militancy.
- Our common-sense understanding of belief may be useful predictions

Theoretical frameworks are also important in exploratory studies, where you really don't know much about what is going on, and are trying to learn more. A conceptual framework is a concise description of the major variables operating within the arena of the problem to be pursued. Following are some independent variables:

Military Operation in Waziristan



Main Junctions of Operation



Sararogha---Kotkai---Janataa---Ladha---Makin---Baddar---Tiarza---Chagmalai

This theoretical framework refers to the major theories/ models upon which

“Military Operations in Waziristan: Public Perceptions in Pakistan on Terra”

is based. It is; of course, a **deductive** inquiry tends to test established model/theory. Deductive studies tend to be quantitative and look to see whether or not a prominent model/theory explains a given set of phenomena.

The assumption of the public perception is based on aggregate of individual attitudes or beliefs shared by some portion of adults. Public opinion is made known in a democracy by voting and responding to polls, as well as participating in protests and lobbying by interest groups. There are very few issues on which most Americans agree. When a large proportion of the public does appear to hold the same view on an issue, a consensus exists. If opinion is polarized between two quite different positions, divisive opinion exists. The operational framework of the study reflects the collective attitude of tribal of South Waziristan. How they behave towards the fighting and the situation of insurgency in Pakistan.

Literature Review

The Pakistani government sent thousands of troops into the region in 2002 to hunt for bin Laden and other al-Qaeda fugitives. In March 2004, heavy

fighting broke out at Azam Warsak, near the South Waziristan town of Wana, between Pakistani troops and an estimated 400 militants holed up in several fortified settlements. It was speculated that bin Laden's deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri was among those trapped by the Pakistani Army.

Pakistan needed weapons for its army and Britain wanted the army to protect its interests; a decision, which pushed us into becoming a rentier state. In hindsight, it appears that the faith in proxy warriors has turned out to be a significant reason for making Pakistan a dangerous place to live and pushing it further towards the abyss of state failure (Rashid: 2000).

Crevelde (2007) predicts that combat in low intensity conflict causes regular forces to degenerate into a police force and if the struggle lasts longer, then into armed gangs. It is unavoidable that in the struggle in Waziristan and Afghanistan, the advantages available to Pakistan, NATO and the United States through their strategic respective armies is neutralized.

Apparently, the rules governing this war are different and citizens are combatants

in this battle of conviction. The Taliban feel that the US forces are “Kafir” or non-Muslims, who must be removed from Afghanistan through Jihad. The Pakistan army and Gen. Musharraf are identified by the Taliban as comprador of the US and to be dealt with under the doctrine of “Takfir”. The existence of such an ambivalent situation, where on the one hand, the Pakistan government is fighting the Taliban and on the other hand it permits the functioning of the religious alliance governments in NWFP and Baluchistan with close links to the Taliban has puzzled many other political analysts (Rubin, 2006).

The confusion is providing both time and space for the creation of another Hamas or Hizbullah in Waziristan and Eastern Afghanistan in the near future. When that happens, Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s JUI (F) and its military wing Harkatul Ansar will be in the forefront to capitalize on the mistakes of their rivals (Shahzad 2004).

The UK Guardian, reported that Christina Rocca told the Taliban in the last pipeline negotiation in August 2001, just five weeks before 9/11, that, “Accept our offer of a carpet of gold, or

we bury you under a carpet of bombs” (Behan,2207)

The Waziristan Taliban movement is now fighting against the Pakistani and the U.S forces. The Taliban are a serious embarrassment for the national pride of Pakistan. The founding fathers of Pakistan used the Islamic rhetoric for the raising of the Pakistani “Muslim nation” at its infancy phase of state building, but now the same rhetoric has transformed itself under the Taliban regime into a battering ram which is challenging the endurance of the state walls of Pakistan: ill judged state policy based on expediency has lead to unintended consequences damaging the state (Behan, 2007).

A group of hostile Taliban fighters began collecting military conscripts in the Mahsud area of South Waziristan and about four truck and busloads of fully armed men began their journey increasing in size as the convoy picked up Mujahadeens on the way. It entered the area of Razmak in North Waziristan and added more military conscripts in strength, more than any number the Pakistani army could register for the

fulfillment of the military service (Daily Times).

The Taliban originated as a movement of hard-line religious students in Afghanistan and gained control of the country in the mid-1990s. The country had been devastated, first by the brutal war against the Soviet Union, and then in an even bloodier civil war that filled the vacuum that followed the Soviet departure. In these circumstances, the Taliban initially gained the support of some who would not have otherwise been drawn to their extreme religious views. Additionally, the movement originated in the country's southwest, home to the nation's largest ethnic group, the Pashtun (John, 2007).

Once in power, the group imposed strict enforcement of fundamentalist Islamic law, banning movies, music and forcing women out of schools and into all-enveloping burqa clothing. The Taliban also provided a haven for Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda organization. International condemnation of its harsh measures had little effect on the regime, which seemed almost to welcome pariah status. After attack on the World Trade Center in New York on Sept. 11, 2001, President Bush gave the Taliban an

ultimatum to hand over Mr. Bin Laden. When it refused, the United States joined forces with rebel groups that had never accepted Taliban rule, notably the Northern Alliance, which represented minority tribes. An air and ground campaign began that drove the Taliban out of the major Afghan cities by the end of the year (John, 2007).

As the American military focus was diverted to the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the Taliban regrouped and began to extend its influence in the southern part of Afghanistan. The resurgence of the opium trade helped fill the group's coffers. As the fighting continued, the ranks of the Taliban were bolstered by foreign recruits from Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Chechnya, various Arab countries and perhaps Turkey and western China. By late 2007, 5 to 10 percent of full-time Taliban fighters were believed to be foreigners and foreign-born men had replaced mid-level and senior Taliban commanders who had been killed in combat (John, 2007).

The roots of the TTP as an organization began in 2002 when the Pakistani military conducted incursions into the tribal areas to originally combat foreign (Arab and Central Asian) militants

fleeing from the War in Afghanistan (2001-present) into Pakistan. (Bajoria² February 6, 2008). Abbas, (2004) article by the BBC explains:

Since the start of the operation, the [Pakistani] military authorities have firmly established that a large number of Uzbek, Chechen and Arab militants were in the area. ... It was in July 2002 that Pakistani troops, for the first time in 55 years, entered the Tirah Valley in Khyber tribal agency. Soon they were in Shawal valley of North Waziristan, and later in South Waziristan. This was made possible after long negotiations with various tribes, who reluctantly agreed to allow the military's presence on the assurance that it would bring in funds and development work. But once the military action started in South Waziristan a number of Waziri sub-tribes took it as an attempt to subjugate them. Attempts to persuade them into handing over the foreign militants failed, and with an apparently mishandling by the authorities, the security campaign against suspected al-Qaeda militants turned into an undeclared war between the Pakistani military and the rebel tribesmen(Fair,2011).

Many of the TTP's leaders are veterans of the fighting in Afghanistan and have supported the fight against the NATO-led ISAF by providing soldiers, training, and logistics (Siddiq, 2011). The TTP differs in structure to the Afghan Taliban in that it lacks a central command and is a much looser coalition of various militant groups, united by hostility to the central government in Islamabad (Shane, 2009-10-22). Several analysts describe the TTP's structure as a loose network of dispersed constituent groups that vary in size and in levels of coordination (Elias, 2009).

The Pakistani government has been conducting military operations in South and North Waziristan since the beginning of June. Their goal has been to eliminate the country's most wanted terrorist, Beitullah Mehsud, and his network.(Emal, 2009)Beitullah Mehsud has focused on attacking and destabilizing the Pakistani government from the time he formed the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – an umbrella group of roughly thirteen Pakistani Taliban factions(BBC in December 2007). He justified targeting his fellow Muslims and countrymen by accusing the Pakistani government of being an

apostate regime under the control of the United States.(Al Jazeera,2008). The motivation behind the attacks, which occurred in the Orakzai district of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas on August 13, was likely two-fold (Abdul, 2009). First, the military likely hoped to diminish the overall force levels of the TTP. Second, Hakimullah Mehsud and a commander named Wali-ur-Rehman appear to be the top contenders to succeed Beitullah Mehsud as the head of the TTP.

Third, this strategy could generate a severe IDP situation for the Pakistani government, similar, although on a smaller scale, to the situation in Swat after the military's clearing operations there led to more than two million IDPs(Deutsche Welle, July 24, 2009). The U.N. estimates that 45,000 IDPs have already left South Waziristan, and it anticipates that a full-scale military operation there could lead to the displacement of up to 150,000 people(Dawn,2009). Nonetheless, a recent statement by the Pakistani Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, suggests that the state will pursue one of these first two military strategies: “[Operations] will continue until Beitullah Mehsud's

group is eliminated forever”(CBS News,2009). The U.S. military has labeled Sirrajuddin Haqqani as the greatest threat to security in eastern Afghanistan, and the State Department earlier this year put a \$5 million reward out for information leading to his death or apprehension (Bill, 2009). The Haqqani network operates a number of religious and military training camps throughout Waziristan and relies heavily upon foreign fighters to execute its attacks in Afghanistan (Haqqani, 2009). The Pakistani military could attempt to emulate the efforts of American forces targeting Haqqani strongholds on the Afghan side of the border (Tom, 2009).

6. Hypotheses

- Hypothesis- 1 Taliban are more likely terrorists*
- Hypothesis- 2 Al-Qaeda is the mastermind behind the Taliban's mission of militancy*
- Hypothesis- 3 Drone attacks is the main hitch between US-Pak understanding of terra phenomena*
- Hypothesis- 4 War on terror in Waziristan is perceived as the war of America*
- Hypothesis- 5 It is more likely that Pakistan is not sincere in Taliban elimination*

Methodology

The methodology used in this study is exploratory and explanatory in nature for evaluating public perception regarding the military action in Waziristan. This cross-sectional survey was conducted in Waziristan "Local Tribes" of Wazir and Mehsud. The research method involve data gathering through Closed-ended questionnaire of multiple choices (check a box rather than filling in a line) from the target area of Waziristan. This method has been chosen in order to test and validate study's hypotheses.

Procedure/ Sampling techniques

All the four Tehsils (Sarvakai, Sararogha, Teyaarza, Makin and, Ladha) were selected for the study. The sample was also consisted upon the local tribal in South Waziristan Agency. The sample size for the investigation was 100 Local Tribal. The convenient method of sampling has been adopted. For data gathering strata were made out of the total four Tehsils and through proportional ratio the numbers of respondents were selected. A face-to-face interview was scheduled with respondents. They were oriented about

the study and also given them a background of the phenomenon.

Analysis and Results

This section presents the inferential statistics. For easy understanding I have categorized the numerical information according to the nature of the question asked from the tribal.

Two way analysis of variance and x^2 test is applied (ANOVA allows us to compare multiple groups on multiple independent variables and therefore can look at both main and interaction effects within the data set) for treatment of hypotheses testing to test the equality of responses from the respondents. It assumes that the samples are normally distributed. Normality for a certain study is the pre assumption that all the collected information are as the researcher thought before conducting the research. The hypotheses are stated in descriptive terms in the light of statistical results that make it possible to calculate the significant statistics of acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis. Tables of analysis of variance and Chi-Sq indicates as SS is the sum of squares (the variation), df the degrees of freedom, MS the mean square

(the variance, which is SS/df), and F is the F ratio (which is between MS divided by within MS).

Table 1 Public perception about the war on terra in Pakistan
Chi-squared (X^2) 7x5 contingent table

X	*SA	*A	*N	*DA	*SD
Pakistan is not sincere in Taliban elimination	30.93	32.02	3.81	19.75	13.49
Tribal provide shelter to Taliban	31.54	32.66	3.89	20.15	13.76
Pakistani forces have suffered a lot	30.93	32.02	3.81	19.75	13.49
Pak-Afghan border has become a cause of great concern for the United States	37.11	38.42	4.58	23.71	16.19
US war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan has created many problems for the investment community in the region	31.54	32.66	3.89	20.15	13.76
North Waziristan is America's new front line in the war against the Taliban	30.93	32.02	3.81	19.75	13.49
Operation against the militants is the dire need of the time	34.02	35.22	4.20	21.73	14.84

*SA stands for "strongly agree", *A for "agree" *N indicates "neutral", *DA for "disagree" and *SD for "strongly disagree".

Table 1 shows that the statistical analysis of X^2 describes the df=24 and calculated result of $Chi-Sq = 8.202 + 3.791 + 0.009 + 20.748 + 3.144 + 2.888 + 0.055 + 1.143 + 3.887 + 0.553 + 2.662 + 0.278 + 0.863 + 4.817 + 0.018 + 0.456 + 4.687 + 1.451 + 4.470 + 5.952 + 5.739 + 1.651 + 2.148 + 6.170 + 3.319 + 1.618 + 2.521 + 0.174 + 4.817 + 2.233 +$ while the total level of index of score is $0.000 + 0.406 + 8.027 + 3.507 + 0.047 = 112.452$ with $P\text{-Value} = 0.000$. This result maintains the high significant level of public perception. We can conclude that Pakistan is not sincere in Taliban elimination, provide shelter to them on the loss of huge suffering of

forces. Pak-Afghan border has become a cause of great concern for the United States and US war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan has created many problems for the investment community in the region. The finding further described the perception of tribal that Taliban is the other side of ISI that North Waziristan is America's new front line in the war against the Taliban. This analysis supports the supposition that Operation against the militants is the dire need of the time.

Basic objective behind the activity of foreigners and local tribal

Findings of analysis of variance found that both foreigners and local tribal were fighting against Pakistan military forces in SWA. They were of the opinion that it was a US led force not Pakistan military forces. Table data have shown that "Fight against US led forces in Afghanistan" "to create disturbance in the country" and, "for financial benefit" was $DF=2$ SS 1185.3 MS 592.7 $F_{9.07}$ $P=0.053$. This table concluded that Taliban (foreigners and local tribal) fighting against US led forces. The general perception of the public was found terrified. They were annoyed of

the government wrong policy regarding the handling of the situation.

Table 2 Status of the Taliban

X	Yes	No
Terrorist	57 (55.89)	33 (34.11)
Mujahid	61 (62.11)	39 (37.89)

Table 2 indicated that (55.89) of the respondents were of the opinion that the conflict between Taliban and military forces in Waziristan is not the war of Pakistan and given the status of terra elements. It was found that (62.11) gave them the status of Mujahiddin. $\chi^2 = 0.022 + 0.036 + 0.020 + 0.032 = 0.110$. $DF=1$, and $P\text{-value}=0.741$. We reject H_0 . Taliban are not fighting against America/ NATO forces but targeting Pakistani forces and civilians.

Mastermind behind the Terra mission

Results showed that the regression is significant $Df = (df \text{ total} - df \text{ between groups}=1)$, SS and MS was found 277.71 for Al-Qaeda, 64.29 for Religious activists and, while SS 342.00 for RAW. Regression of F was 4.32 for Al-Qaeda. The results indicated with $P\text{-value}=0.285$ significant that Al-Qaeda was considered the mastermind behind the Taliban’s mission in Waziristan.

Table 3: Drone attack and Pakistani forces operation in Waziristan

Categories	Wrong	Right	Total
Pakistani forces Operation	87 90.50	13 9.50	100
Drone Attacks	94 90.50	6 9.50	100
Total	181	19	200

Table 3: result of $\chi^2 = \{0.135 + 1.289 + \dots\}$, $\{0.135 + 1.289 = 2.850\}$ and $DF = 1$, $P\text{-value} = 0.091$ is significant. As hypothesized, “public condemn the use of force either by Pakistani forces or drone attacks of NATO forces in Waziristan”.

War against America or Pakistan

Statistics of data $\{\chi^2 = 17.943 + 16.898 + 17.943 + 16.898 = 69.683\}$ shown that the $DF = 1$, $P\text{-Value} = 0.000$. The result of people’s answers to the question that war in Waziristan was the “war against America or Pakistan”, categorically declared as war against Pakistan. Many said that it is inevitable in war that people will die. Indeed, once war starts, civilian casualties are unfortunately almost a guaranteed certainty.

Table 4 Media coverage to IDPs’ problems and unfair behavior of the local people

Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Factor	1	2	2	0.01	0.931
Error	8	1625	203		
Total	9	1626			

Individual 95% CIs For Mean

Based on Pooled StDev

Level	Mean	StDev	-----*-----
Media coverage to IDPs	20.00	12.98	(-----*-----)
Unfair behavior of the local	20.80	15.42	(-----*-----)

Analysis of Variance of table 1.4 have shown that SS=2 MS=2 F-distribution=0.01 and the P-value=0.93. The finding indicated that the perception of the people of South Waziristan bases of correct decision where they identified that media coverage to IDPs and unfair behavior of the local people. Statistics showed that M=20.00, 20.80 SD=20.80, 15.42 of the claim of media coverage to IDPs and unfair behavior of the local people

Conclusion & Discussion

Pakistan should take strong action against the insurgency and militancy in the country. Pakistan seems to be a sincere ally. Duel policy would strike

Pakistan itself. Pak-Afghan border has become a cause of great concern in terms of security and the NATO forces have a great concern. US war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan has created many problems for the investment community in the region. The think tank of US kept a close link with collision forces to monitor the North Waziristan. Operation against the militants is the dire need of the time. The present situation is going from bad to worst because every thing is damaged in South Waziristan of the people.

The results confirmed that both foreigners and local tribal were fighting against Pakistan military forces in SWA. People expressed their opinion that Al-Qaeda was the mastermind behind this mission. Apparently, people accepted that Taliban creates disturbance in the country and also got financial benefits but results have been shown that they subsequently targeting NATO forces. Findings support the hypothesis “Taliban fights against America/NATO forces”. Participants were of the opinion that the fighters are not fighting against America/ NATO forces but targeting Pakistani forces and civilians and were relatively more conscious about this

situation. Results categorically signify that Al-Qaeda was considered the mastermind behind the Taliban's mission in Waziristan and clearly support the hypothesis "Al-Qaeda is considered the mastermind behind the Taliban's mission in Waziristan".

This empirical study further confirmed the assumption that public condemn the use of force either by Pakistani forces or drone attacks of NATO forces in Waziristan. This study seems that it is the war in Waziristan was the war against Pakistan. It was found that the perception of tribal about this structure of Waziristan is to change in F.C.R as compared to other status. Levies were considered more careful for public security while Ulema are more trustable than other sections of the area. It was founded that availability of public security and education system are the first priorities, roads and communications, and agency council election are second priorities, while FATA Secretariat is the third priority of local tribal of Waziristan.

The military often manipulates the mainstream media, by restricting or managing what information is presented

and hence what the public are told. For them it is paramount to control the media. This can involve all manner of activities, from organizing media sessions and daily press briefings, or through providing managed access to war zones, to even planting stories. The military option the Pakistani government elects to pursue will reflect on its commitment to the war on terror and its partnership with the United States. Pakistan will demonstrate a continued willingness to try to defeat the Taliban that operates against Islamabad if it chooses to maintain the status quo or elects to dismantle the TTP completely. At the same time, however, such an approach would indicate Pakistan's desire to conduct operations on its own terms, with its own objectives. Islamabad will signal a serious commitment in defeating terror and a strengthening relationship with the United States if it elects to cooperate with the United States and target groups that threaten U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan's upcoming decision on future military operations will prove critical to the war on terror and its relationship with the United States.

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