

PERILS AND PROSPECTS OF NATIONAL INTERNAL SECURITY POLICY AND NATIONAL ACTION PLAN

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ABSTRACT

Ten months taking after the Peshawar APS assault in Dec 2014 and the foundation of the National Internal Security Policy (NISP), an All Parties meeting was directed including the top military brass, led by the PM Nawaz proclaimed an expansion of 20 points of National Action Plan (NAP) to counter extremism and terrorism in the country. The recently detailed National Action Plan fundamentally redesigned through a thought-process and set the objectives of the NISP yet displayed 2 new points: the death penalty was forced on the attackers of Army Public School (APS) and other having a terrorists activities and the establishment of Army courts to manage the postponed trials of “jet black” terrorists to curb radicalism and militancy in the state. In view of this scenario, this paper attempts to propose some reflections on what are the policy management challenges in implementation of NISP and NAP? What is the state’s deficiencies of regulatory authorities which plague the effective implementation of National Internal Security Policy (NISP) in Pakistan? What are the perils and prospects of National Action Plan (NAP)? And what are the achievements of National Action Plan (NAP) thus far?

Keywords: *National Internal Security Policy, National Action Plan, National Counter Terrorism Authority*

INTRODUCTION

The latest National Action Plan has been conceived to battle the difficulties raised by both terrorism and militancy and spotlights the progressing radicalization and instability. The arrangement becomes possibly the most important factor as an aftereffect of detailing of National Internal Security Policy (NISP) that has sustained for over a year. Though, since start of devolution changes of 2010, the changed governmental political structure and the civil military separation that diagrams Pakistan's power landscape affected the usage of both the approach systems. Truly, what engages the military to impact all state choices identifying with security is polite military divergence over the long haul. The military is on the front to handle inside security issues according to the depiction of the arrangement and the caution of the civilian government. As for Afghanistan and India, the outer security issues are specifically identified with the interior security. Be as it may,

there are numerous genuine interior security challenges confronted by the brought together organization of inner security structures.

Whether the civilian governments are allocated the power on the National Internal Security Policy is not sure and that how far is the elected equipped for delivering changes to accomplish the wanted results. So far the advancement remains blended. Late details of the advancement flag a weakening of the terrorist objectives, which are initially settled to make a move against banned outfits and Madrasa Mafia, into fighting the repercussions from religious militias. For this intention, Pakistan's authorities must bridle both military and civilian institutions. To successfully accomplish this objective, an assorted and solid strategy is expected that include an Internal Security Adviser, National Intelligence Directorate, Parliamentary cooperation, improved financial commitments, enhanced powers of the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), provincial counterterrorism strategies on counter-terrorism, education reforms and changing public narratives. There must be a handy execution of such measures with vital institutional reforms.

LITERATURE REVIEW

After sixty-seven years of independence, Pakistan formulated its first counter-terrorism policy known as National Internal Security Policy. The policy is worth a dime in all respects being the first of its kind. Some contended that this is a remarkable achievement and some propounded that the policy is not merely the first in its kind for the purpose of being a civilian stand on the issue conventionally controlled by the security establishment but also clear as to its operation in policy making. The assertions need a detailed discourse on the issue in a step-by-step mechanism. There are three sections of the NISP: secret, operational and strategic. According to the depiction of the MOI, the key part concentrates on transactions with those militants who consent to a compromise and the individuals who don't are at the hit-rundown of the security organizations and operations are dispatched to handle those unwilling ones. (Dawn, 2014)

The key components of the NISP are the integration of national efforts, and the mutual consensus. It contains three main factors;

- To initiate dialogue with all those who have stakes in one way or the other
- Separation of terrorists from their sponsors
- Deterrence proliferation through authority-building of the security institutions and to neutralize dangers likely to harm country's domestic security

Five motives are maintained in the policy and arguably all of them are hard to defeat:

- To protect citizens and to reserve the writ of the central government

- To preserve the property, basic rights and the lives of the locals of the country
- To promote democracy, freedom, pluralism and tolerance among people
- To prohibit and repel dangers to the internal safety in a clear and justified manner
- To skillfully tackle contentions and resolve disputes without any compromise

The improvements made in the security strategy include improvement in the ‘law and order’ and all-encompassing campaign for the security of the civilians and that the plan acts to coordinate the central and provincial governments. A present strategic body for coordination, NACTA (National Counter-terrorism Authority), shall apply the NISP provisions and put them into practice with the assistance of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), provincial governments and intelligence agencies such as Military Intelligence (MI) and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) (Dawn, 2014). The security plan focuses on coordinating the security efforts and so implements them as to make them work together. It does not however presume to isolate the activities in order to achieve the desired degree of tranquility in the country.

National Action Plan Agenda

- Punishment for "dark black psychological militants" sentenced to death
- Establishments of Army Courts under military supervision
- Ban every single other militant organization
- NACTA requirement and usage
- Severe action against hate literature
- Ban on the funding of particular organizations
- Restricting banned organizations to work under another name
- Establishment of an special counter-terrorism courts
- Safety of religious minorities
- Regulation of seminaries
- Disassemble terrorists’ communication systems
- Check on the spread of terrorism on online networking and the Internet
- Continuation of Karachi Operation
- Assigning self-ruling power to Balochistan to handle security
- Prevention of sectarianism
- A exhaustive policy for Afghan refugees
- Refinement of Criminal Law for intelligence operations
- Amendment in constitution for military courts

Policy Management Challenges

It's the genuine obligation of the NISP and the NAP to coordinate security efforts crosswise over federal and provincial governments. Their duty incorporates dismantling

terrorist networks, drawing in all partners and keeping check by using the assets of security organization to find inside shades of hatred and guarantee security. Both the NAP and NISP gives a more advantageous way out if strategies are implemented in a down-to-earth, composed and convenient way. The main thing prone to bar the execution is the dispute amongst federal and provincial over vital security development, the inconclusive field of the parts of NACTA over security confirmation and counter-terrorism endeavors, arrangement of data sharing amongst military and police. Besides, amid the primary quarter of the detailing of NAP, organization made vital alterations to decay the counter-militant arrangement by destroying three convincing elements: Madrasa changes, action against banned organizations and restoration of Afghan refugees. It was to damper the expected backlash from the militants. (Yusuf, 2015)

Over-centralization

In February 2014, upon the formulation of the NISP, the federation portrayed that PM Sharif would set up an agreement, looking for the confidence and suggestions of every one of the four Chief Ministers of provinces, after developing co-appointment amongst provincial and central governments as respects counter-terrorism. A determination was held yet the the Council of Common Interests (CCI) and constitutional body for policy coordination was not considered. So the past course of activities keeps the procedure running (Dawn, 2014). Notwithstanding, provincial governments were not taken into confidence upon the plans of the NAP and NISP. Uncertain degrees of powers continue hindering the advancement of each of them hardly, given that the main center of the Nawaz governance is by all accounts Punjab, disregarding all different provincial through and through. The opponent party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf represents the most jeopardized territory Khyber Pakhtunkhawa (KP) and is not on single page with federal government on different issues.

The Role of NACTA

The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was establishment not just to take a long-terms measure of the test of terrorism in Pakistan, additionally would guarantee that all measurement of terrorism in Pakistan - rough radicalism, terrorism, and uprising - would be treated with due significance. As the incomparable national counter terrorism non-military personnel body, NACTA can impact general national security arrangement adequately exchanging, at the appointed time, the responsibility for national security methodology from the military to the non-military personnel government in Pakistan (Dawn, 2014). There needs to be a strong system of coordination and communication between the central and provincial governments, security institutions and military intelligence in order to put NISP into proper implementation and to repel insurgency for which no such system is ever-established. However, NACTA is proposed to provide with

such a set-up to maintain internal safety with the given mechanism (Dispatch News Desk, 2014).

Coordination Challenges

New Internal Security systems require NACTA to set up a Joint Intelligence Directorate under its watch. It's additionally vital for all intelligence institutions to pass on and spread data to the federal and provincial governments and to the Internal Security agencies, for example, ISI through NACTA. According to sources, the data sharing from the ISI and the NACTA is delicate in view of the normal dangers identified with it, in which military-situated insight is additionally included. The JID (Joint Intelligence Directorate) does not basically endow that turf to the civilians in light of the army impedance, as attested by a report of an investigator (Newsweek Pakistan, 2014). Truth must be told the NISP strategy was modified and deciphered into the JID to set up DIS (Directorate of Internal Security) and the staff included armed force and civil branches of the federal government. The motives of the particular JID were to alert the security organizations of the suspect terrorist wings and the postured militant dangers. The JID is yet not completely into impact (Express Tribune, 2014). The key operations countering terrorism are as yet going ahead due to the 'true' administration of the armed force security powers.

Role of Dedicated Forces

A RRF (Rapid Response Force) comprising of paramilitary forces and police was developed to watch the capital city, Islamabad, 3 months after the NISP endorsement from the federal Cabinet. The Rapid Response Force is at risk to check crime and terrorism in the capital. (Express Tribune, 2014). The watching and observing of the Rapid Response Force is in the charge of NACTA which furthermore incorporate the officers of the paramilitary troops, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), Islamabad police (Express Tribune, 2014). The extraordinary teams of the ATF (Anti-Terrorism Force) of the Punjab were named to handle terrorism in the Punjab province and military officers and prepared commandos gave preparing to the ATF in January 2015 (Ghumman, 2014). Through a merger made by the provincial government, the CTD (Counter Terrorism Department) consumed into the ATF inferable from its reported disappointments to capture and distinguish the key suspect of terrorism, dismantling their patron networks, focusing on their plans and annihilating their monetary streams (Kharal, 2013). Other neighborhood organizations have connected the comparable system. Later on, Military prepared another faculty of the Balochistan Anti-Terrorism Force (Shah, 2015).

There is a devoted police order in the region of Balochistan which is regulated by a senior police official (Balochistan Police, 2015). The Sindh Government has gone with the same pattern and arranged its own ATF and proposed to make a police CIW (Crime

Investigation Wing) and Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) (The News Tribe, 2014). However the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government has yet to build up a particular team for countering terrorism, it has, then again, figured Counter-Terrorism Department with positive and clear directions to give reconnaissance and observing, intelligence collection, attempting terrorism cases, capturing terrorist groups, investigation and examination militant related cases and also and arresting of criminals and militants. (Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2015). It is excessively rushed, making it impossible to translate the execution of these bodies since they are excessively dynamic early since their beginning. In any case, the different issues promotion challenges experienced by the police force and other security organizations are not went to by the definition of these existing bodies. Obviously, the Punjab government's CTD had exceedingly prepared device to for checking yet it was not utilized as adequately as proposed (Manzoor, 2013). Moreover, the training set for police division is not in accordance with counter-terrorism procedures (Capital TV, 2013).

Need for Broader Police Reform

However the role played by police in counter-terrorism exercises is essential. In cutting edge, the police office is isolated into numerous sub-offices as to policing which is a focused on undertaking. The focal part of the police is result-held in admiration of operations in the light of the fact that the police needs to hold close relationship with different working agencies and holds upgraded data for effective counter terrorism exercises. For common citizens, the first and the chief division to connect with law authorizing organizations and security outfits of the nation is the police. There, the absence of trust between these two spaces may lose grounds (The News, 2013). Every civil government has its own particular police office however the battles to get changes the division have been weightless since 2008. Upon the government taking over control in 2002, various change were reviled which were directed under Gen Musharraf's organization in 2008. The upgraded money related capacitance for police divisions has been brought over, as said prior, for example, the government of KP expanded budgetary figure for security changes by 66% since past 5 years.

For the budgetary help of the groups of saints who lost lives in the war on dread, extra subsidizing was made to their beneficiaries as increased salaries, improved health facilities, and compensation packages. In any case, the police are not equipped for battling terrorism in its present structure, despite the fact that they are on the front line in the war against terrorism. Investigators suggested that the presentation of 11 thousand police power was required relating to the Peshawar's 6.7m populace in spite of the fact that it has 6 thousand power at present. Moreover, amid 2010 to 2014, the government of Punjab additionally expanded assets for peace by 61% (The News, 2014). These asset

appropriations are so far for the whole segment and genuine police office budgetary figure have immovable given the swelling rate is considered while translation of the figure. In the same time frame, the legislature of Sindh proposed a budgetary increment of 54% for interior security request (Government of Sindh, Finance Department, 2014). However because of responsibility for cutting edge and modernized assets and gear, the police power of Sindh has similarly demonstrated compelling responsiveness to handle the issues experienced by provincial security (Saeed Shah & Syed Shoaib Hasan, 2014).

Unclear Financing

Notwithstanding the distribution of assets, federal counter-terrorism based policies are hesitant to talk on the conceivable answer for persuade the provincial government to force changes and use the assets all the more viably. Then, the organization has banned from planning any more supports for the reason. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) Nisar Ali Khan allegedly depicted the extra requirement for 32b PKR for the relevance of the NISP in spite of revealing it. A great deal of this cost, 22 billion addresses basic spending and 10 billion gave under the Federal NISP actions (Sher & Azad, 2014). Notwithstanding, in the fiscal year 2014-15 (which happened after the underwriting of NISP), the national government cut sponsoring for NACTA 95m-92m, consolidating 63m in administrative costs related to salary. Also, council has furthermore generally decreased the spending dispersion for interior division, which manages the associations accountable for inside security related issues, (for instance, paramilitary administrations), around 40% for the fiscal year 2014-15 spending arrangement (U.S. Institute of Peace Reports, 2015). On the off chance that the federal budget is a political obligation commitments, NISP is unmistakably not a need. Or maybe, zones have extended regular spending arrangement for the states and control and check over organizations.

Madrassa and School Curricula

Another convincing major challenge the security establishment is the Madrassa systems. According to reports embraced by Islamabad and Rawalpindi police, there has been a solid association of some Madrasas from Deobandi School in supporting the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Azeem, 2014). The religious Madrasas are observed to be required in exercises going about as supporters or guarantors of TTP and their sufferers of extortion in Islamabad (capital city), as reported by a few media bunches (Azeem, 2014). Other tactics which these seminaries used is in the form of sectarian conflict between Shia and Sunni school of thoughts. The NAP and NISP are in charge of the control and observing of the Madrasas and Mosques. The government proposes to develop a broad and widely comprehensive policy to screen Madrassa systems by accepting beneficial changes and anticipating outside sponsorships of such sectarian religious groups (Javed, 2013). Fifty percent (50 %) Madrasas, at the present, are

highlighted to play in the ring as mushrooming extremism and getting financial assistance from abroad.

Federal Ministry of Education requested the enrollment of no less than 10 thousand Madrasas in Dec 2013 (Tankel, 2011:224). Operations of the forces in conjunction with the approaches of NAP and NISP got antagonistic input from conservative religious parties (Rahman, 2014). In any case, government and plans and coercive measures are shafts separated. So far the reaction has been viable as opposed to specialized; it is to catch the associates rather with improving the regulatory environment. In the nation, an expected number of enrolled Madrasas is around 22,052, and a large portion of the Madrasas are unregistered and out of security check (Express Tribune, 2013). The PMEB (Pakistan Madrasa Education Board) is intended to modernize the conventional religious Madrassa. Deliberate Registration and Regulation Ordinance 2002 for religious Madrasas was confirmed (Iqbal, 2003). It is in the order of the NISP and NAP to deliver open mindfulness that addresses the genuine meaning of Islam instead of the stance supported by the militant groups and organizations, yet the achievement of this story is as yet wriggling (Hasan, 2014).

DISCUSSIONS

The mistreatment and terrorism based on 'war on terror' excuse has made condition of Pakistan worse and has shown that the country has a capacity to handle Terrorism. The country faces gigantic inconveniences not adjusted to the Internal and External security. Masters say the country is weak in mental terms, be that as it may it will continue with the fight against terrorist groups. The State needs to go past the conventional system for the preclusion of gatherings and develops a technique to piece new channels for aggressors' strong assets. It is an honest to goodness test for the Establishment of Civil-Military to control terrorism in country. In any case, Security System is doing everything attainable for him to control mental abuse and to balance not jeopardize the whole society. The vitality in the country creates and implies a positive sign that all political and military qualities got together to find an answer. These are indispensable contemplations (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

It is enabling that the gatherings are made to look at all these issues at any rate, a few conformities on the long haul would require point interviews and accord: for example, the enlistment and control of Madrasas and their remote financing, changes in FATA and Political bargain with dissenters in Balochistan. The Plan needs clear benchmarks to achieve its objectives and obligation and straightforwardness is required. Security administrations and different bodies explored 183,557 people, out of which 8,800 suspect terrorist groups captured all through the nation in 2 months of 2015, according to media

reports (Hashim, 2015). Since the APS assault in Peshawar in Feb 2015, armed force reported to have destroyed 293 militants in the operations notwithstanding the catches and cross examinations. There has been a productive change in the relations with United States and Afghanistan after the accomplishments throughout operations to cut off al-Qaeda and TTP arranges and execute the Haqqani bunch. Federal government additionally called for Afghani government to kill TTP dwells and sources in their area. Along these lines it is opined that the Pak military is making room for shared exchange amongst Taliban and the Afghan government (Sethi, 2015).

The inconvenience of the death penalty for the suspect terrorist groups was the top most warmed space of the NAP (National Action Plan) and it resuscitated following a time of 10 years (Hussain, 2015). The execution got numerous negative responses. There will be a need for the detailing of a procedure to keep mind inside security of the nation. In like manner, Governments and the examiners preclude to notice that the kind of war terrorist groups are conveying is very distinctive and basically setting up armed force courts to stop them is insufficient. Whether armed force might surrender vital assets, for example, Jihadist local armies is indistinct (ISPR, 2014). Domestic Security can't be tackled without first shaping a sound and general national security arrangement and system that surveys and addresses both inside and outside security situations and fuses all measurements from military energy to remote approach. Despite fact that they perceive the aftermath of past Afghanistan and India-centric policies on the inside security environment, both the NAP and the NISP are at last quiet on turning around the outside measurements of the security policy. (Bruneau & Matei, 2008).

CONCLUSION

The National Action Plan is a positive stride yet not a panacea to counter the profoundly established issue of terrorist activities in the nation. The momentum in the nation is ready, and it appears a positive sign that all the political powers and military met up to discover an answer for it consistently. However, the arrangement has some major issues also, which may not look good for the objectives it is embarked to accomplish. It is embraced in a hurry without required consultations. The present arrangement has put the majority of the weight of counter-terrorism policy on the military. From the utilization of power to arbitrary arrests and legislation duties now lie with the armed force. It is satisfactory that boards of trustees are made to investigate every one of these issues, yet a portion of the focuses would require long consultations and accord: for the occasion, the enrollment and observing of Madrasas and its remote financing, changes in FATA and political compromise with non-conformists in Baluchistan. Besides, it ought to break into short-, medium-, and long haul objectives. Further enactment would be required to investigate the issue in more detail.

The reaction to domestic security after Peshawar assault exhibits more congruity than a change in the state's way to deal with counter-terrorism. The issue with the NAP is its hazy methodology favoring military and deadly drive. Enacting draconian counter-terrorism legislation and carrying out executions and arbitrary arrests deprive citizens of fundamental rights while failing to make them any safer. The militarized approach cannot bring peace in FATA region either. Sentencing civilians in military courts and hanging them without straightforwardness while denying non-military personnel law-requirement offices of assets and bypassing the legal are the most insufficient approaches to counter terrorism. Rather than further undermining the criminal equity framework, elected and civilian governments ought to upgrade police's ability to distinguish, avert and examine wrongdoing and prohibit parallel military structure which has made perplexity and redirected limited resources.

The changes and switching concessions to the security establishment will require significant endeavors from the lawmakers. The restriction gatherings ought to move the into guarantee coherence of the established request. They ought to frame a non-military personnel drove counter-terrorism procedure taking into account zero resilience towards brutal militant gatherings with no refinement between good militant and bad militant, as the executive has over and over vowed. Moreover, instead of spending huge amounts on defense and military expenditure, the government should spend this money on the education of the people which poor cannot afford. The most important reason behind the involvement into terrorism activities is because illiterate people cannot do reasoning and analyze and sometimes even don't know their ethics. Hence, going to the roots causes is very important to eliminate the terrorist activities in Pakistan completely.

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